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LEGISLATING VIRTUE:
HOW SEGREGATIONISTS DISGUISED
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS
MORAL REFORM FOLLOWING
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
ANDERS WALKER
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated
school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education,1  Mississippi Cir-
cuit Judge Tom P. Brady2 delivered a speech to a chapter of the Sons
of the American Revolution on the decision’s consequences.  Brady’s
speech, later published and popularized throughout the South,3 de-
clared that the ruling’s ultimate goal was not educational equality,
but racial amalgamation:4
Let’s get one thing unmistakably clear, the leaders of the three mil-
lion block-voting negroes of the North and East and of California,
together with segments of the Communist-front organizations of our
1.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2.  Educated at Yale, Tom P. Brady became the intellectual leader of the Citizens’ Coun-
cil movement, arguably the largest anti-integration movement in the South.  See JOHN
BARTLOW MARTIN, THE DEEP SOUTH SAYS “NEVER” 16 (1957); JAMES GRAHAM COOK, THE
SEGREGATIONISTS 14, 16 (1962).  The Citizens’ Councils spread across the South and played a
crucial role in orchestrating southern resistance to integration.  Specializing in propaganda and
legislative activism, the Councils were composed of members of the southern elite.  The Coun-
cils were committed to resistance through legal means and shunned the violent methods em-
ployed by more populist resistance organizations like the Ku Klux Klan.  See NEIL R.
MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RE-
CONSTRUCTION, 1954-1964, at 360 (1971); NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE  SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S, at 190-211 (1969).
3. See TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY ii (1955). Brady’s piece was entitled “Black
Monday” in reference to May 17th, 1954, the day the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Brown.  See id.  Once it was published, Brady’s speech became an influential part of segrega-
tionist literature throughout the South.  See MARTIN, supra note 2, at 16-21; COOK, supra note
2, at 14.
4.  See BRADY, supra note 3, at 64-65.
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population, have set as their goal the ‘passing’ of the negro in these
United States . . . . These new deal, square deal, liberated, black
qualified electors are determined to indoctrinate the Southern negro
with this ideal, and arouse him to follow them in their social pro-
gram for amalgamation of the two races.5
Racial amalgamation, Brady contended, would occur via interracial
sexual relations, and in particular through intermarriage: “The
American negro, like any intelligent white man, knows his weak-
nesses and shortcomings . . . . He furthermore realizes that he can
ameliorate these inherent deficiencies by intermarriage, just as the
strain of a long horn can be improved by being bred with a white-
faced Hereford.” 6
Despite the alarmist tone of his claims, Brady was not alone in
his contention that Brown, which invalidated the proposition that ra-
cially separate schools could be equal, would inspire intermarriage.7
5. Id. at 64.
6. Id. at 66-67.
7. David Lawrence, a columnist published in newspapers across the South, advanced a
similar view:
Integration of races of all schools throughout the United States is a long way off—
years and years, and maybe never.  It is as far away or as near as the day when pres-
ent advocates of integration are willing to face, possibly in their own families, the
real issue—the intermarriage of white sons and daughters with Negroes.
David Lawrence, Says ‘Mixing’ Far Away: Intermarriage Held to be Real Issue, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 21, 1956, at 10. (The Richmond News Leader, the Nashville
Banner and the New Orleans Times-Picayune are three of the papers that published Law-
rence’s columns.)  Former Georgia Governor Herman E. Talmadge agreed: “The ultimate aim
and goal of NAACP leaders in the present segregation fight is the complete intermingling of
the races in housing, schools, churches, public parks, public swimming pools and even in mar-
riage.  It is so evident that even White apologists for this organization must now admit it.”
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, YOU AND SEGREGATION 42 (1955).  Even pro-integrationists like
Dean Gordon B. Hancock, a black columnist for the Atlanta Daily World, noted the extent to
which intermarriage was linked to Brown: “Every argument against the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion of May 17, 1954, and every argument against integration the white man has been able to
propound, is the argument against interracial marriage.”  Dean Gordon B. Hancock, Between
the Lines: Interracial Marriage a False Alarm, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Apr. 12, 1956, at 4.
For a discussion of the significance of white southerners’ fear of interracial marriage after
Brown, see MCMILLEN, supra note 2, at 184-86.
Fears of intermarriage persisted despite the existence of antimiscegenation statutes in
every southern state.  In 1955, the Supreme Court of the United States delayed ruling on
whether a Virginia antimiscegenation statute was constitutionally valid. See Naim v. Naim, 350
U.S. 891, 891 (1955).  Specifically, the Court said that the record of the case was inadequate
and would not allow a “clean cut” consideration of the constitutionality of antimiscegenation
laws.  See id.  Some interpreted the Court’s reluctance to rule on the constitutionality of these
laws as an attempt to stall for time, and to postpone the inevitable demise of antimiscegenation
laws.  Referring to Naim, popular newspaper columnist David Lawrence wrote:
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Similar fears emerged throughout the South, and reflected a general
fear on the part of segregationists that if desegregation occurred, it
would affect not only the education, but the psychological develop-
ment of their children.8  As Judge Brady stated in his Black Monday
speech:
You cannot place little white and negro children in classrooms and
not have integration.  They will sing together, dance together, eat
together and play together.  They will grow up together and the sen-
sitivity of the white children will be dulled.  Constantly the negro
will be endeavoring to usurp every right and privilege which will
lead to intermarriage.9
The claim that African-American10 children would be the agents
of intermarriage served an important goal of segregationists. It en-
abled them to claim that black people, and not themselves, were the
agents of wrongdoing.  It also enabled them to play on Darwinian
fears that African-Americans secretly wanted to intermix with whites
in order to raise themselves up, and bring whites down, on the great
ladder of racial superiority.11  This explained segregationist tenden-
cies to couch integration as a communist plot.12  Because intermar-
riage would end all racial distinctions, not only in terms of color but
also in terms of intelligence, segregationists feared that it would lead
to an egalitarian society where neither race nor class existed, much
like the one envisioned by Karl Marx.13
The fear of intermarriage did more than raise the specter of
communism;14 it resonated with and allowed segregationists to draw
The Supreme Court of the United States a few weeks ago sidestepped a decision on
the issue of racial intermarriage.  For technical reasons, it refused to decide whether
a Virginia State law prohibiting intermarriage of races was constitutional. . . . An-
other case is certain to come before the highest court soon.  If it is decided that state
laws prohibiting intermarriage are unconstitutional, the issue will bring even more
friction than the question of school integration.
Lawrence, supra, at 10.
8. See MCMILLEN, supra note 2, at 184.
9. BRADY, supra note 3, at 65.
10. I shall use “African-American” and “black” interchangeably.  See Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
103, 119 n.2 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY].
11. See BRADY, supra note 3, at 66; MCMILLEN, supra note 2, at 185-86.
12. See BARTLEY, supra note 2, at 187-88.
13. See MCMILLEN, supra note 2, at 196.
14. Although fears of intermarriage were rampant within the segregationist South, they
were not the only criticisms of Brown.  The primary legal argument that segregationists used to
WALKER1 06/04/98  1:30 PM
402 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:399
from a series of mythological stereotypes regarding African-
American sexual behavior.15  These stereotypes, many of which dated
back to slavery, enabled segregationists to resurrect the great gen-
dered allegory of sexual racism: the cult of southern womanhood.16
In this allegory, the southern white girl, helpless and vulnerable, risks
being violated by the black male, who is invariably portrayed as being
overtly sexual and predatory.17 The southern white girl, of course,
represents all that is virtuous about the South.18  The black male, on
the other hand, represents all that is threatening.19  Like segregation-
challenge Brown was the claim that the Supreme Court had overstepped its constitutional
bounds, and had violated states’ rights.  For a description of the centrality of states’ rights ar-
guments see BARTLEY, supra note 2, at 126-28, 241. An indication that legal arguments did not
hold the same sway over southern whites as fears of intermarriage did, however, emerged in
Robert Penn Warren’s documentary work Segregation, The Inner Conflict in the South. While
interviewing a segregationist organizer in 1955, for example, Warren asked if states’ rights was
the main issue behind resistance to the ruling.  “Yes,”  the organizer answered, “in a way, . . .
but you got to fight on something you can rouse people up about, on segregation.  There’s the
constitutional argument, but your basic feeling, that’s what you’ve got to trust—what you feel,
not your reasons for it.”  The segregationist then offered Warren handbills showing pictures of
a black man and a white woman in bed together under the heading “Harlem Negro and White
Wife.”  On the back of the handbill was a crudely drawn valentine-like heart, and in it the head
of a white woman about to be kissed by a black man.  Two vultures perched on the heart.  Be-
neath it read the caption, “The Kiss of Death.”  See ROBERT PENN WARREN, SEGREGATION:
THE INNER CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH 24-25 (1956).
15. For discussions of these types of stereotypes, see HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK
FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 535-36 (1976); GEORGE M. FREDER-
ICKSON, THE  BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 256-82 (1971); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE
CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMAN-
CIPATION 111-51 (1984).  “Of all the theories purporting to explain the role of sex in race rela-
tions,” race theorist Charles H. Stember writes, for example, “none has received such wide-
spread acceptance or has seen as many variations as the theme of black sexuality. . . . [T]he
underlying theme that blacks are more passionate sexually, courses through all of them.”
CHARLES HERBERT STEMBER, SEXUAL RACISM: THE EMOTIONAL BARRIER TO AN IN-
TEGRATED SOCIETY 54-55 (1976).  “The notion of black sexuality has centered largely on the
black male although the theory, in its pristine form, included both sexes.”  Id. at 55.
16. For a discussion of the cult of southern womanhood, see MCMILLEN, supra note 2, at
184-85.
17. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO 1550-1812, at 473 (1968) (discussing the punishments, including castration, of black
men who had or had attempted to have sexual liaisons with white women); WILLIAMSON, supra
note 15, at 307-09.  Expressing the threat of intermarriage in terms of white womanhood en-
abled segregationists to skirt the uncomfortable truth that white men had, prior to emancipa-
tion, taken advantage of black women with relative impunity.  See id. at 307.
18. Tom Brady claimed in his Black Monday speech, for example, that “[t]he loveliest and
the purest of God’s creatures, the nearest thing to an angelic being that treads this terrestrial
ball is a well-bred, cultured Southern white woman or her blue-eyed, golden-haired little girl.”
BRADY, supra note 3, at 45.
19. Frantz Fanon writes that throughout history, not only sexuality but also immorality
and sinfulness in general came to be associated, in the white mind, with black men:
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ists around the South began to do after Brown, Brady resurrected this
allegory in his Black Monday Speech:
If trouble is to come, we can predict how it will rise. . . . The fulmi-
nate which will discharge the blast will be the young negro school-
boy, or veteran, who has no conception of the difference between a
mark and a fathom.  The supercilious, glib young negro . . . will per-
form an obscene act, or make an obscene remark, or a vile overture
or assault upon some white girl.20
Although segregationists encountered little difficulty finding al-
legorical stereotypes of black moral and sexual behavior in southern
racial mythology, they confronted a challenge to these assertions
lodged in the very ruling they sought to reject.  In footnote eleven of
the Brown opinion, the Supreme Court cited specific scientific evi-
dence showing that black children were not agents of destruction but
victims of southern white oppression.21  Because it drove against some
of the more powerful justifications for southern resistance to integra-
tion, this footnote became a significant thorn in the segregationists’
side.22
Stung by the Supreme Court’s faith in what they believed was
sociological trickery, and at the same time determined to show that
their assertions regarding the nature of African-Americans were true,
[T]he black man is the symbol of Evil. . . . The torturer is the black man, Satan is
black, one talks of shadows, when one is dirty one is black—whether one is thinking
of physical dirtiness or moral dirtiness.  It would be astonishing, if the trouble were
taken to bring them all together, to see the vast number of expressions that make the
black man the equivalent of sin.
FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS 188-89 (Charles Lam Markman trans., Grove
Press 1967) (1952).  As Dorothy E. Roberts shows, it was not only males who were implicated
in the construction of myths that equated blackness to immorality. “One of the most prevalent
images of slave women,” she writes, “was the character of Jezebel, a woman governed by her
sexual desires.”  Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 10, at 384,
390.
20. BRADY, supra note 3, at 63-64.
21. See  Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11 (1954) (citing studies con-
ducted by well-known social scientists like Kenneth B. Clark, Franklin B. Frazier and Gunnar
Myrdal).
22. See James Reston, A Sociological Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at L14;
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 711 (1975).  One of the best analyses of the segregationist
response to footnote eleven can be found in JAMES JACKSON KILPATRICK, THE SOUTHERN
CASE FOR SCHOOL SEGREGATION 176 (1962) (contextualizing the footnote within an in-depth
segregationist critique of the scientific evidence relied upon in Brown). Kilpatrick’s editorials
contributed significantly to segregationist resistance to Brown.  See BARTLEY, supra note 2, at
129-30.
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segregationists carried their resistance to a previously unexamined
level.  This Note demonstrates how segregationists proceeded to use
social science evidence themselves as a tool for resistance to integra-
tion.23  This maneuver was designed to support segregationists’ rhe-
torical claims about black behavior.  Part I discusses how segrega-
tionists used social science evidence, and particularly statistics on
marriage and illegitimacy, as indicia of black immorality in order to
scientifically verify otherwise mythological stereotypes of African-
Americans.24  Part II shows how a series of opaque laws on marriage
licenses and birth certificates were passed after Brown to actually
manipulate these statistics in order to bolster segregationist claims.25
Specifically, it shows how these regulations lowered the statistical
evidence of marriages and raised the statistical evidence of illegiti-
macy among blacks, thereby creating a statistical backdrop of im-
morality that resonated with and reinforced segregationist propa-
ganda.  Part III discusses how these laws not only created a seg-
regationist justification for resistance to integration, but laid the
foundation for new strategies of racial discrimination in the post-
Brown South.  It specifically illustrates how these laws created a
coded discourse that enabled segregationists to further white su-
premacy by substituting supposedly neutral principles for overt classi-
fications of race.
A central assumption of this Note is that the segregationist em-
ployment of social science, and particularly segregationist attempts to
use statistics to devise new strategies of racial discrimination, were
distinctly different from previously studied aspects of southern resis-
tance.  Scholars of the period, for example, have focused almost ex-
23. That segregationists would turn to social science to aid them in resistance to Brown is
not a total surprise.  After all, the intellectual leader of massive resistance, Judge Tom P.
Brady, taught sociology at the University of Mississippi before becoming a lawyer.  See COOK,
supra note 2, at 15, 23.
24. Other indicia of immorality within black communities were also used, but to a lesser
degree.  These included rates of venereal disease, bigamy and fornication.  See KILPATRICK,
supra note 22, at 64.
25. This Note investigates these laws for the first time.  Until now, attention has been fo-
cused primarily on laws designed to combat Brown directly, by impairing black political and
economic power and generally obstructing attempts at desegregation.  See generally BARTLEY,
supra note 2, at 200-36 (outlining white southerners’ concerted efforts at white solidarity and
societal hegemony in the wake of Brown).  The Bartley work is currently the definitive text on
southern resistance to Brown.  See also Michael Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations:
The Backlash Thesis, J. AM. HIST., June 1994, at 81, 101-18 (emphasizing Brown’s role in crys-
tallizing white southerners’ desire to maintain educational and social segregation).
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clusively on overt segregationist defiance to Brown.26  They have con-
centrated specifically on segregationist attempts to thwart integration
by engaging in relatively public strategies like closing schools, found-
ing pupil placement programs, passing interposition resolutions and
disenfranchising blacks.27
The strategies that are examined in this Note represent a dis-
tinctly different mode of exercising power.  Rather than relatively
simplistic attempts to thwart integration, this Note shows that segre-
gationists also engaged in highly discursive strategies of resistance
that facilitated continued discrimination by recreating the way in
which the law defined African-Americans.  These strategies, partly
because of their subtlety, were surprisingly modern in scope.  By sub-
stituting abstract classifications of morality for race, they mimicked
similar strategies employed, as Stanley Fish notes, by racists today:
The response of former and present bigots . . . is to figure out a way
of appropriating . . . new vocabulary so that it transmits the same old
messages.  The favorite strategy is find a word or concept that seems
invulnerable to challenge—law, equality, merit, neutrality—and
then to give it a definition that generates the desired outcome.28
By focusing on strategies imposed by segregationists after Brown that
were discursive in nature, that tended to manipulate statistics and
rhetoric, and that introduced new referents for race in both statutory
and social practice, this Note provides a new perspective on the
southern response to Brown.
26. See Klarman, supra note 25, at 97 (arguing that Brown drove the South into a state of
racial fanaticism marked by the violent suppression of Civil Rights demonstrations in the 1960’s
and that Brown unleashed a “wave of racism that reached hysterical proportions” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also BARTLEY, supra note 2, at 344 (summarizing southern re-
sistance to Brown as culminating in “chicanery,” “suppression,” and “extralegal vigilante ac-
tivities”).
27. For discussion of segregationist strategies to close schools, and for discussion of the
creation of pupil placement programs, see BARTLEY, supra note 2, at 275; for discussion of in-
terposition resolutions, see id. at 126; for discussion of the disenfranchisement of African-
Americans, see id. at 200-01.
28. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH 91 (1994).
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I. SEGREGATIONIST EMPHASIS ON ILLEGITIMACY AND MARRIAGE
RATES AS INDICIA OF IMMORALITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
COMMUNITIES FOLLOWING BROWN
In his work The Southern Case for School Segregation,29 re-
nowned Virginia journalist and segregationist James Jackson Kil-
patrick30 presented a case for continued segregation based on statisti-
cal measurements of a variety of African-American behaviors.  This
work, published in 1962—almost a decade after Brown—dramatizes
the extent to which segregationists had turned away from mythologi-
cal allusions and towards social science evidence to support their
racist claims.  Kilpatrick’s work, which is laid out in the form of a le-
gal brief, differs significantly from Judge Tom Brady’s widely popu-
lar, flamboyant and at times even delusional Black Monday speech.
In support of his study, Kilpatrick cites, inter alia, statistics on
levels of violent crime, incarceration, and scholastic test scores.  He
also refers to a variety of “moral signifiers,” among them rates of pre-
marital pregnancy and illegitimacy.31  Similar signifiers were used
throughout the South beginning almost immediately after Brown to
validate segregationist claims of the low moral level of African-
Americans.  Foremost among these were marriage and illegitimacy
rates.
A. The Use of Marriage Rates as Indicia of Immorality among Blacks
After Brown, segregationists touted disparities between white
and black marriage rates32 as statistical evidence that African-
Americans were less moral than whites.33  Charleston, South Caro-
lina’s News and Courier reported, for example, that:
29. See KILPATRICK, supra note 22.
30. Not only did Kilpatrick fight Brown via books like The Southern Case For School Seg-
regation and through his editorial column in the Richmond News Leader, but he also played a
significant role in segregationist politics.  He was instrumental, for example, in the revival of
interposition resolutions across the South.  See BARTLEY, supra note 2, at 183.
31. See  KILPATRICK, supra note 22, at 60-63.
32. On June 10, 1955, The Charleston News and Courier published an article entitled Ne-
gro Marriages, Illegitimacy Up, which noted that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on pub-
lic schools has opened a field of conversational topics regarding the social habits of the white
and Negro races in the South.  One of these concerns the proportion of white and Negro mar-
riages, births and illegitimacy.”  Negro Marriages, Illegitimacy Up, THE NEWS AND COURIER
(Charleston), June 10, 1955, at 12-A [hereinafter Negro Marriages].
33. See id.  Segregationists were not the first to employ marriage as an indicator of moral-
ity.  Similar comparisons were made by whites before the Brown decision.  See GUTMAN, supra
note 15, at 539.
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While legal marriages (those where licenses are obtained and used)
are on the increase among Negroes, the statistics show they still have
a long way to go to catch up with white people.  With an almost
evenly divided population, in 1954 only 1,132 Negro couples ob-
tained marriage licenses in [Charleston] county as compared with
2,104 whites.34
Disparities in official marriage rates became more than a mere
subject of segregationist interest; they ultimately evolved into indict-
ments of black behavior.  For example, a Mississippi newspaper re-
ported that “[n]ot more than 20 per cent of the Negroes are mar-
ried . . . . If you will pick out ten Negro families and check the
records, you will find that not over two of them are actually legiti-
mately married.”35  Assuming a posture common among whites in the
South, Reverend Louis E. Dailey of North Carolina claimed that the
rest of the country could not understand the supposedly true level of
immorality among African-Americans.  He asserted, for example,
that “[s]outhern whites are the only people in America who can tes-
tify to . . . the low moral level of the Colored in marriage relation-
ships . . . .”36
Segregationists argued that the disparities in marriage rates be-
tween the races were a sign of moral inferiority.  In reality, these dis-
parities reflected the influence of slavery on the evolution of the
black familial structure, which created significant differences between
black and white families.  It was common, for example, for slaves to
have their own marriage ceremonies.37 Additionally, frequent sales
influenced the development of black families as extended kinship
networks rather than as nuclear units.38  These factors, particularly
the tendency towards extended families, proved useful survival
mechanisms for blacks facing the poverty and discrimination inherent
in post-slavery America.39  In deep South states like Mississippi, these
mechanisms manifested themselves statistically in terms of high rates
of common law marriage.40
34. Negro Marriages, supra note 32, at 12-A.
35. J.A. Thigpen, Thigpen Report Shows Less Than A Fifth Negro Parents Are Wed,
DELTA DEMOCRAT-TIMES (Greenville, Miss.), Nov. 17, 1955, at 13.
36. LOUIS E. DAILEY, THE SIN OR EVILS OF INTEGRATION 39 (1962).
37. See GUTMAN, supra note 15 at 347-48.
38. See id. at 342, 468.
39. See CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN 124 (1974).
40. See HORTENSE POWDERMAKER, AFTER FREEDOM: A CULTURAL STUDY IN THE
DEEP SOUTH 143-49 (Atheneum 1969) (1939).
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A long recognized tradition in black communities in the South,41
common law marriage shared the basic characteristics of state
authorized marriage, but lacked the legal rights and obligations that
accompanied it.42  Nevertheless, some states tolerated it and even
counted common law relationships as legitimate.43  To mention this
fact, and to describe the historical realities that lay behind its evolu-
tion, however, would have greatly undermined the segregationists’
goal of proving their assertions about the immorality of African-
Americans.  Consequently, segregationists ignored historical reality
and concentrated instead on developing statistics to bolster racial
stereotypes.
B. The Use of Illegitimacy Rates as Indicia of Immorality among
Blacks
While segregationists commonly referred to low marriage rates
as scientific evidence of black immorality, they placed even greater
weight on a direct consequence of these rates: illegitimacy.  In fact,
illegitimacy became perhaps the greatest statistically measurable sign
of supposed immorality within black communities.  Citing a study
completed in 1944 by Guy B. Johnson44 which documented popular
stereotypes about African-Americans, James Jackson Kilpatrick
wrote:
Let us go back, for a moment, to Dr. Johnson’s “stereotype.”  Mani-
festly, many of the characteristics he finds most widely attributed to
the Negro are incapable of statistical measurement . . . . But one
characteristic found to be more typical of the Negro than of the
white is “high sexual indulgence, larger sphere of permissive sexual
relations, . . . and high rate of illegitimacy.”  The illegitimacy, at
least, can be statistically tabulated, and the appalling facts can be
41. See id. at 149 (describing the frequency of common law marriage within lower and
middle class African-American communities).
42. See id. at 152-53 (describing the differences between common law and licensed mar-
riage such as the legally enforceable property rights that accompanied licensed marriage). For
a definition of common law marriage as understood by segregationists, see 1957 Op. Ga. Att’y
Gen. 93 (noting that to establish a common law marriage, both parties must be able to make a
contract, must actually make an agreement to live together as if they had a licensed marriage,
and must consummate that agreement by cohabitation).
43. See Daniel E. Murray, Domestic Relations, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 428, 429 (1958)
(noting the failure of a bill in Florida that would have abolished common law marriages).
44. See Guy B. Johnson, The Stereotype of the American Negro, in CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE AMERICAN NEGRO 1-23 (Otto Klineburg ed., 1944).
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faced . . . . [T]he illegitimacy rate among Negroes in this country is
roughly ten times the illegitimacy rate among whites. 45
Kilpatrick was not the only segregationist to focus on illegiti-
macy rates among blacks.  The Citizens’ Council, the official newspa-
per of the Citizens’ Council movement, published an article on deseg-
regation in Washington, D.C. in February 1957, which discussed
differences in moral standards between the races, noting: “Racial dif-
ferences in matters of health and moral standards are of acute con-
cern to white parents.  Official records on the incidence of venereal
disease and pregnancies show that there is a sound basis for this con-
cern.  Approximately one-fourth of the Negro school children them-
selves are illegitimate.”46  Popular South Carolina journalist William
D. Workman, Jr., whose columns were read across the South, drew
similar conclusions based on illegitimacy rates in Washington D.C.:
“There were 3,533 illegitimate births of all ages in Washington in
1955, of which 382 were white and 3,151 colored.” . . . Is it any won-
der, in the light of such disclosures, that proposals for the forcible
mingling of Negro and white children should draw such intense resis-
tance from the mothers and fathers of the white children?47
As the above quotation suggests, illegitimacy rates, because they
were loaded with moral connotations and perhaps even more signifi-
cantly because they were statistically measurable, presented what
segregationists characterized as compelling scientific evidence that
African-Americans were immoral.  By focusing on these “objective”
rates, along with statistics on low frequencies of marriage within Af-
rican-American communities, segregationists attempted to substanti-
ate claims that segregation was morally justified.  The use of these
statistics lent established stereotypes a veneer of scientific authority.
This was an important asset, for it suggested to the world that preju-
dice in the South was founded not on superstition, but on scientifi-
cally supportable fact.
45. KILPATRICK, supra note 22, at 59 (second omission in original).
46. Reaping the Whirlwind—Integration in Washington Creating Ominous Unrest,
CITIZENS’ COUNCIL, Feb. 1957, at 3.
47. WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR THE SOUTH 173-74 (1960) (quoting a re-
port from a Georgia congressman who cited the testimony of a D.C. Department of Public
Health employee).
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II.  MANIPULATING INDICIA OF BLACK IMMORALITY: INCREASED
REGULATION OF MARRIAGE LICENSES AND BIRTH CERTIFICATES
Segregationists’ emphasis on marriage and illegitimacy rates as
indicia of high levels of immorality among African-Americans coin-
cided with the introduction of a series of laws that increased the
regulation of marriage and the recordation of illegitimacy rates
across the South.  These laws intentionally manipulated the indicia of
marriage and legitimacy rates in order to bolster segregationist claims
of black immorality.  This occurred in two ways.  First, by increasing
the regulation of marriage licenses, the laws made legitimate mar-
riages harder to obtain.  This difficulty consequently lowered mar-
riage rates and increased illegitimacy rates among blacks.48  Second,
by increasing regulations on birth certificates, the laws insured that
out-of-wedlock births would be recorded and tabulated, thereby
raising reported black illegitimacy levels.
A. Increased Regulation of Marriage Licenses
Regulations on marriage licenses increased across the South af-
ter Brown.  On July 1, 1958, for example, Louisiana passed a law that
required individuals applying for a marriage license to present certi-
fied copies of their original birth certificates along with medical cer-
tificates dated within ten days of the license application.49  Both re-
quirements introduced administrative hurdles into the process of
acquiring a licensed marriage.  The medical certificate had to verify
that the party was not carrying any venereal diseases, and had to be
signed by a physician.50  Although less emphasized than low rates of
marriage and high rates of illegitimacy, rates of venereal disease
within black communities were also used by segregationists to vali-
date racist claims regarding the “moral character” of African-
48. It is important to note that these laws also affected whites.  In other words, common
law marriage and illegitimacy were by no means limited to African-American communities.  As
this Note shows, however, segregationists focused on marriage and illegitimacy rates among
blacks in order to further their discriminating goals.
49. See Act of July 1, 1958, No. 160, 1958 La. Acts 609, 609-10.  Evidence that this re-
quirement made it significantly harder to acquire a marriage license emerged in an attorney
general’s opinion in 1958.  See 1958 Op. La. Att’y Gen. 25, 26 (describing alternative routes
that could be taken for those who did not have birth certificates).
50. See Act of July 1, 1958, 1958 La. Acts at 610.
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Americans.51  Such claims suggest this law not only threw an added
hurdle into the marriage license process, but directly targeted blacks
through assumptions about their behavior.
In 1956, Georgia passed an act incorporating a series of require-
ments for obtaining a valid marriage license.52  The statute required,
for example, that each license be directed to a judge, justice of the
peace, or minister of the gospel to authorize the marriage.53
Other requirements made it harder for day-laborers to obtain a
license.  For example, one provision declared that marriage licenses
could be granted only by the registrar, or his clerk, at the county
courthouse, between the hours of 8 A.M. and 12 P.M.54  Of course,
most people worked between these hours.  As an accommodation to
workers, the act declared that the clerk of court could also grant li-
censes at his personal residence.  This provision, favoring those who
either knew the clerk personally or felt comfortable approaching his
private residence, may explain how whites got around the otherwise
awkward time schedule.55
In 1957, Georgia passed an act that may have imposed a more
significant burden on many license applicants.  The Georgia act de-
clared that the dissolution of previous marriages would no longer be
presumed when an individual applied for a marriage license.56  In-
stead, the applicant carried the burden of proving that any prior mar-
riages had been legitimately dissolved via divorce.57  This law, like the
Louisiana requirement that applicants for a license produce a medi-
cal certificate attesting to the absence of venereal disease, may also
have targeted African-Americans in particular.  Usually not in pos-
session of a state authorized marriage license in the first place, Afri-
51. See W.E. DEBNAM, THEN MY OLD KENTUCKY HOME, GOODNIGHT! 97 (1955)
(emphasizing the fact that reported cases of syphilis were 12 times higher among African-
Americans in Virginia than among whites).
52. See Act of Feb. 14, 1956, No. 37, 1956 Ga. Laws 43, 44.
53. See id. This measure may have been passed not only to limit the number of people who
could perform a marriage, thereby making a license harder to get, but may also have been
passed in anticipation of the fall of antimiscegenation laws in the South.  Supposing that the
antimiscegenation statutes were struck down in Georgia, this act could make it very hard for
interracial couples to find an individual to perform their marriage.  For example, a 1954 attor-
ney general opinion discusses a prohibition against African-American ministers performing
marriages for anyone other than African-Americans.  See 1954 Op. Ga. Att’y Gen. 155, 155.
54. See Act of Feb. 14, 1956, 1956 Ga. Laws at 43, 44.
55. See id.
56. See Act of Feb. 22, 1957, No. 85, 1957 Ga. Laws 83, 83.
57. See id.
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can-Americans could rarely obtain an official divorce,58 yet common
law marriage could only be legally dissolved by an official divorce de-
cree.59
Although regulations on marriage were increased significantly in
Georgia and Virginia, the most profound regulations on marriage
were passed in Mississippi.  This is no surprise; Mississippi, the heart
of what was then known as the “black belt,” contained counties with
some of the highest percentages of black to white ratios in the nation,
a situation that impressed upon segregationists the imperative of
maintaining segregation and white supremacy.60  Because Mississippi
increased regulations on marriage more than any other state, it serves
as a particularly good case study of how statistics of moral tendencies
were not only increasingly emphasized after Brown, but were actually
manipulated.
In 1956, the Mississippi legislature passed several bills that in-
creased the regulation of marriage and marriage licenses in the
state.61  Evidence that these bills were intended to become part of a
larger scheme to fight integration emerged in the Baton Rouge
Morning Advocate on April 1, 1956.  “Moving swiftly through the fi-
nal hours,” the paper reported, “[Mississippi’s] two houses passed:
The governor-endorsed bill outlawing common-law marriages, the
last of a block of bills designed to throw up a bulwark around the
state’s segregation laws.  The theory of the bill was to set up unfavor-
able moral background as a basis for segregation.”62
58. See infra text accompanying note 70.
59. Common law marriages still require a formal divorce in order to be legally dissolved.
See LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 151 (1996).
60. For a discussion of the racial make-up of certain key counties in Mississippi, and why
that influenced the level of segregationist resistance, see MCMILLEN, supra note 2, at 19-20;  see
also BARTLEY, supra note 2, at 84-86.
61. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.  The year 1956 marked the apex of seg-
regationist resistance to Brown.  Commenting on a Citizens’ Council rally held in celebration of
the denial of admission of African-American student Autherine Lucy to the University of Ala-
bama, John Bartlow Martin wrote:
The date was February 11, 1956.  It was, perhaps, high tide of the Council movement,
its greatest hour.  After that night there could be no doubt that the South, the only
section of the United States which has ever gone through the excruciating experience
of being enemy-occupied territory, had found in the Citizens’ Councils a flag to rally
round.  The Deep South was solid once more.
  MARTIN, supra note 2, at 41.
62. Legislators in Mississippi End Session, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr. 1,
1956, at 10-D.
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Mississippi’s statute required all marriage applicants to obtain
marriage licenses, it limited the group of individuals who could per-
form marriage ceremonies, and it declared marriages entered into
without licenses or without authorization void.63  This act, which did
not operate retroactively, effectively ended recognition of common
law marriage in the state.64  Consequently, it struck at the heart of
black familial relations and created a situation ripe for the statistical
tabulation of immorality within black communities. Individuals en-
gaged in common law relationships no longer had legally recognized
marriages and children born out of common law relationships had no
defense against allegations of illegitimacy.  Senator  W.B. Alexander,
one of the ten Senators who opposed the bill, appealed to the hearts
of the legislators and called “it ‘a cruel thing’ to illegitimatize chil-
dren and force them to live in adultery,” particularly since “common-
law marriages have been recognized among English speaking people
for centuries.”65
In conjunction with its invalidation of common law marriage,
Mississippi enhanced the mechanism through which this delegitima-
tion could be captured statistically.  Specifically, it required that
forms showing detailed information about marriage license appli-
cants, including their race, number of past marriages and how their
last marriage (if any) was terminated, be attached to marriage li-
censes and later sent to the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State
Board of Health.66  These statistics were sent to the National Bureau
of Vital Statistics in Washington, D.C.  A look at the national statis-
tics reveals the effectiveness of the block of statutes described above.
63. See Act of Apr. 5, 1956, ch. 239, 1956 Miss. Laws 289.  Hortense Powdermaker, in his
cultural study of the deep South, noted that Mississippi had traditionally recognized common
law marriage.  See POWDERMAKER, supra note 40, at 149.
64. See Act of Apr. 5, 1956, 1956 Miss. Laws at 289.
65. Coleman Secures Passage of Bill to Aid Segregation, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson,
Miss.), Mar. 31, 1956, at 1.  The actual vote in the Senate was 29 to 10 in favor of the bill.  See
id.
66. See Act of Mar. 22, 1956, ch. 302, 1956 Miss. Laws 399.  The Bureau of Vital Statistics,
in Mississippi and other southern states, was the agency that tabulated statistics on race and
morality.  J. David Smith wrote of W.A. Plecker, Virginia’s Registrar of Vital Statistics, that
“[a]s State Registrar of Vital Statistics, Plecker was in a strategic and powerful position relative
to race issues.  For years he . . . pursued with vengeful enthusiasm individuals and groups he
felt were violating the race integrity laws of Virginia or what he perceived to be the natural
laws of racial separation.”  J. DAVID SMITH, THE EUGENIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA 60 (1993).
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FIGURE 1
MARRIAGE RATES IN MISSISSIPPI (WHITE AND BLACK)
1955-1959
The overall marriage rate in Mississippi, as the above figure
shows, declined significantly following the increased regulations on
marriage in the state.67  How did this breakdown work for African-
Americans in particular?  Although no evidence on marriage rates is
available prior to 1957, evidence is available on illegitimacy rates.
Prior to the enactment of the laws, the illegitimacy rate among
African-Americans in Mississippi was fairly stable.  In 1955, the rate
was 212.4 per 1000;68 it remained close this level in 1956, at 212.3 per
1000.69  By 1957, however, after the passage of the laws, the rate
jumped to 221.2 per 1000.70  This rate leveled off to 220.5 in 1958 but
then rose significantly to 238 per 1000 in 1959.71
In contrast to the increase in black rates of illegitimacy between
1955 and 1959, white rates remained virtually the same.  In 1955, for
example, white rates of illegitimacy were at 10.3 per 1000.72  By 1956,
this rate, like the black rate, had changed little, resting at 11.2 per
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, I VITAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1959, at 3-29 [hereinafter 1959 VITAL STATISTICS].
68. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, I VITAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1957, at LXXXIV [hereinafter 1957 VITAL STATISTICS]; 1959 VITAL STA-
TISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 67, at 3-29.
69. See 1957 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 68, at LXXXIV; 1959 VITAL STATISTICS, supra
note 67, at 3-29.
70. See 1957 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 68, at LXXXIV; 1959 VITAL STATISTICS, supra
note 67, at 3-29.
71. See 1957 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 68, at LXXXIV; 1959 VITAL STATISTICS, supra
note 67, at 3-29.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, I VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1955, at LXXV.
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1000.73  In 1957, however, while black rates rose dramatically from
212.3 to 221.1, white rates remained virtually unchanged at 11.1 per
1000.74  In 1958 and 1959, the white rate again remained nearly un-
changed at 12.2 and 12.8 respectively.75  A graph charting the differ-
ential in rates of change between illegitimacy levels of the two races
reveals the extent to which the legislation passed in 1956 enhanced
statistics on illegitimacy among blacks.
FIGURE 2
THE DISPARITY IN RATE OF GROWTH BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE
ILLEGITIMACY RATES IN MISSISSIPPI, 1955-1959
While the rise in black illegitimacy rates in Mississippi can be at-
tributed to drastic changes in marriage laws, this does not mean that
marriage laws alone contributed to the increase reflected in these sta-
tistics.  Even prior to the enactment of these laws, illegitimacy rates
among African-Americans were significantly higher than the rates
among whites.  At the very least, however, Mississippi’s laws reveal a
sudden segregationist interest in tabulating rates of illegitimacy in the
state.  Laws passed in other southern states reveal a similar interest
by the states in statistically measuring the racial distribution of ille-
gitimacy within their borders.
73. See 1959 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 67, at 3-29.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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B. Increased Regulation of Illegitimacy
In 1957, North Carolina passed a broad-reaching act that reor-
ganized the public health laws of the state.76  This act required that all
newborns be registered within five days of birth with the Central Of-
fice of Vital Statistics and that a birth certificate be obtained for each
child.77  Information regarding the parentage of the child was to be
included on the birth certificate.78  Illegitimate children could only be
given the father’s last name with the father’s written consent,79 and
without such consent, the child received the mother’s surname.80
Consequently, it became apparent from the birth certificate whether
or not the child was illegitimate.  This data went directly to the state
registrar.81
Although the increased regulation of birth certificates in North
Carolina is significant, other states’ regulations were even more dra-
matic. In 1954, for example, Louisiana passed an act that stated:
“[A]ll children, upon entering the first grade of any school in the
State of Louisiana shall be required to present a copy of their official
birth record to the school principal.”82  Arkansas passed a similar
rule: “From and after the passage of this Act no child shall be admit-
ted to the first grade of any public school of the state until the parent,
guardian, or some other responsible person has presented to the
proper authorities such child’s birth certificate.”83  These laws created
a means of tabulating illegitimacy rates for children who were already
born, widening the statistical net for indicia of immorality in both
states.
The increased reach of statistical measurement, evident in laws
on birth certificates like the ones in Arkansas, Louisiana, and North
Carolina, as well as the increased regulation of marriage licenses in
Georgia, Louisiana and Mississippi, embodied different manifesta-
tions of the same basic strategy.  By reconfiguring the law in a way
that discredited traditional modes of black family formation,84 these
76. See Act of June 12, 1957, ch. 1357, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws 1458.
77. See id., 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1478.
78. See id., 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1479.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Act of July 8, 1954, No. 573, 1954 La. Acts 1061.
83. Act of Mar. 3, 1959, No. 139, 1959 Ark. Acts 382.
84. Traditional modes of black family formation included not only common law marriage
but in particular extended families.  Often, these families were not marked by direct ties of kin-
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regulations enhanced the statistical perception that African-
Americans were immoral, and that segregationists were therefore
ethically justified in denying them equal rights.
III. SHIFTING THE GROUNDS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION FROM
COLOR TO CHARACTER
While legislation on marriage and illegitimacy enabled segrega-
tionists to bolster the moral argument against integration, it also laid
a foundation for new strategies of racial discrimination in the South.
Not only did the laws enhance the perceived immorality of African-
Americans, but they also facilitated the use of moral character rather
than color as an overt basis for racial discrimination.  Laws in Geor-
gia, Mississippi and Louisiana all provide examples of how this strat-
egy worked.
In 1958, Georgia passed a voter registration act that enabled
voters to register in two different ways.85  Voters could either read
and write intelligibly a section of the Georgia or U.S. Constitution, or
they could exhibit good character and an understanding of the duties
of citizenship by responding to a set of questions.86  Due to the rela-
tively high rate of illiteracy among poor people of both races in the
state, most black applicants chose to answer the questions despite the
fact that the majority of them were disqualified based on their an-
swers.87  Southern writer Stetson Kennedy commented on this use of
moral character as a criteria for purging black voters from registra-
tion lists in Georgia:88
The purge procedure as evolved by Georgia is simplicity itself.  You
receive a legal summons to appear before the county board of regis-
trars at a specified time (invariably during work hours) to ‘show
cause’ why your name should not be dropped because of ‘bad char-
acter’, ‘criminal record’, etc.  If you fail to appear, your name is
ship, and therefore were viewed by whites as immoral.  Rather than signs of immorality, how-
ever, these modes developed as a natural response to unique historical conditions faced by
black people, the most profound of these conditions being slavery.  For example, slaves were
not allowed to obtain licensed marriages.  Further, the pressures of slave life, and in particular
the division of families through sale, contributed to less formal family structures.  See GUTMAN,
supra note 15, at 222-29.
85. See Voters’ Registration Act, No. 321, 1958 Ga. Laws 269, 278.
86. See id., 1958 Ga. Laws at 278-82.
87. See Georgians Stick with State Law on Negro Voting, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton
Rouge), Mar. 1, 1960, at 4-A.
88. See STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE TO THE U.S.A. 157 (1959).
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automatically stricken; if you do appear, it is usually stricken just the
same.89
Mississippi, like Georgia, also began to consider bad moral char-
acter as grounds for rejecting applications to vote.  Mississippi state
Representative Thompson McClellan introduced a resolution re-
quiring that voters be “of good moral character” in order to register.90
This resolution, which made the county registrar the judge of each
applicant’s character,91 was adopted by the Senate on April 28, 1960,
and by the House a few days later.92  It was written into the constitu-
tion on May 23, 1962.93
Shortly after the resolution requiring good moral character was
introduced, Mississippi state Representatives Russell Fox and Tho-
mas McClellan introduced a qualification to the bill that would have
tightened voter qualifications to exclude parents of illegitimate chil-
dren and persons living together in common law marriages.94  Al-
though the resolution never passed,95 it suggests a link in the minds of
certain legislators between moral character, illegitimacy and common
law marriage.
Louisiana provides a more compelling example of how far and in
just how many ways racial discrimination could be furthered through
the creation of a coded discourse for race.  In 1960, the Louisiana
legislature submitted two constitutional amendments to a statewide
referendum to limit voting rights to those who had not committed a
moral crime or misdemeanor and who could otherwise establish good
moral character.  According to the statute, those who had “lived with
another in ‘common law’ marriage within five years from the date of
making application to become an elector,”96 and those who had
“given birth to an illegitimate child within the five years immediately
prior to the date of making application for registration as an elector
did not possess good character.”97  The amendments, which were
passed on November 8, 1960, empowered county registrars to deter-
89. Id.
90. Plan to Limit Negro Voters in Mississippi, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr. 4,
1960, at 11-A.
91. See Work Rights Vote Okayed, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Apr. 20, 1960, at 1.
92. See Act of May 5, 1960, Concurrent Resolution, 1960 Miss. Laws 886, 886.
93. See Act of May 23, 1962, 1962 Miss. Laws 1011, 1012.
94. See Plan to Limit Negro Voters in Mississippi, supra note 89, at 11-A.
95. See Act of May 23, 1962, 1962 Miss. Laws at 1012.
96. Act No. 613, 1960 La. Acts 24, 25 (Constitutional Amendment).
97. Id.
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mine whether individuals were either in common law marriages or
had illegitimate children.98
While the amendments were under consideration, certain legisla-
tors expressed concern that registrars, as the only judges of moral
character, would abuse their privileges.  One such legislator, state
Senator Adrian Duplantier of New Orleans, in jest, “pleaded unsuc-
cessfully for amendments to assure that a man won’t be deprived of
the vote because a hostile registrar decides his ears resemble those of
an illegitimate child.”99  In explaining this statement, Duplantier re-
ferred to a newspaper article “saying a Little Rock, Ark., judge de-
cided paternity cases by comparing ears of male children with ears of
purported fathers.”100  Duplantier continued, “this is what worries me
about letting the registrar decide about me and you being the fathers
of illegitimate children . . . . If he thinks you look like an illegitimate
child he saw recently, he can strike you from the rolls for siring an il-
legitimate child.”101
Duplantier’s fear of the power of state registrars to strike poten-
tial voters suspected of parenting illegitimate children was probably
not completely sincere.  Given the political context of the time, it is
more likely that he was concerned that the broad language of the
legislation, in striking anyone with a misdemeanor, would prevent not
blacks, but whites from voting.  Senator Charles Deichmann, who
later co-authored an amendment to the bill with Duplantier, focused
on Duplantier’s real fear.  As the Morning Advocate reported,
“Deichmann complained the bill to allow voters to be challenged if
the registrar determines they are of bad character made no provision
‘to take care of the city boys who get into trouble from time to
time.’”102  Although not explicitly acknowledged by Deichmann, the
“the city boys” undoubtedly referred to whites in his electoral district
of New Orleans, whites who might be prevented from registering un-
der the overinclusive misdemeanor bill.  Deichmann hinted at this
when he offered amendments that would have deleted the provisions
regarding misdemeanors from the bill, stating, “[m]y amendments are
politically motivated . . . . I feel an obligation to protect the people
98. See id., 1960 La. Acts at 28.
99. Senate Passes Segregation, Withhold Bills, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), July 1,
1960, at 1-A.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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who elected me . . . . I want to protect the interests of the people I
represent who may be confronted by hostile registrars.”103  
Additional evidence that Deichmann was referring to whites and
not blacks emerges from the content of the amendments he proposed
to substitute for the misdemeanor provision.  These amendments,
submitted by both Deichmann and Duplantier, requested specifically
“that provisions be written into the voter qualification bill to allow a
person to be disqualified only if he has been convicted of the newly
legislated crimes of common law marriage and having an illegitimate
child.”104  Such crimes, incidentally, were submitted as part of a Joint
Resolution to amend the state constitution along with amendments
that retained the disqualification of voters based on prior misde-
meanors.105  Approved on November 8, 1960, the amendments were
followed by the language, “[t]he above enumerated acts denoting bad
character shall not be deemed exclusive hereunder but said bad char-
acter may be established by any competent evidence.”106  As the de-
bate over voter disqualification in Louisiana suggests, after Brown,
moral character began to emerge as a coded way of speaking about
race.  Rather than discriminate against African-Americans based on
their color, in other words, segregationists began to discriminate
against them based on preconceptions regarding their character.
Perhaps the best example of how moral classifications replaced
overt references to color emerged in Louisiana in the form of statutes
regulating welfare.  In 1960, Louisiana passed a bill denying welfare
benefits to an illegitimate child “if the mother of the illegitimate child
in question is the mother of two or more older illegitimate chil-
dren.”107  In conjunction with this act, Louisiana passed another law
denying public assistance:
to any person who is living with his or her mother if the mother has
had an illegitimate child after a check has been received from the
welfare department, unless and until proof . . . has been presented
showing that the mother has ceased illicit relationships and is main-
taining a suitable home for the child or children.108
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Act No. 613, Joint Resolution, 1960 La. Acts 24, 25-26 (Constitutional Amend-
ment).
106. Id., 1960 La. Acts at 26.
107. Act of July 7, 1960, Act No. 306, 1960 La. Acts 634, 634.
108. Act of July 7, 1960, Act No. 251, 1960 La. Acts 525, 527.
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Couched in neutral language as a drive to improve morality, the law
affected some 6000 women, 95 percent of whom were African-
American; it derivatively affected 23,000 African-American chil-
dren.109
Louisiana’s bill denying welfare benefits on grounds of illegiti-
macy coincided with an increased tendency to disguise discrimination
as moral reform.  Louisiana state Senate nominee Wendell P. Harris,
representing the East Baton Rouge Parish, described Louisiana’s bill
to deny welfare benefits to families with illegitimate children in terms
that suggested the bill was designed to promote admirable qualities,
completely masking the statute’s true intent.  During a breakfast held
before the Louisiana Chamber of Commerce’s governmental affairs
committee, he stated, “I fear that our welfare program has gone too
far,” and continued, “I am afraid that through our generosity we are
breaking the will of initiative and ambition for our citizens to work
for themselves.”110  A member of the Welfare Board echoed Harris’s
neutral statement by noting that there had been “considerable public
bitterness about the question of tax support for single women who
don’t care how many illegitimate offspring they have.”111
Despite the tendency of politicians like Harris to disguise ra-
cially motivated statutes as moral reform, the transition to com-
pletely neutral language was not immediate.  Some legislators, in
other words, did not catch on.  Another member of the Welfare
Board, for example, stated outright that:
Negroes in the South don’t look upon illegitimacy as anything
wrong.  Even their ministers, I understand, sort of have their own
traditions about this.  We should try to get the Negro leaders to
change this pattern of illegitimacy, by working through the many
109. See Editorial, Suffer Little Children, NATION, Sept. 24, 1960, at 171, 171.  The Nation
described the bill and stated,
It provides that relief funds (mostly federal money, but distributed by the state) shall
be withheld from any woman who has an illegitimate child after she is registered on
the welfare rolls.  As of today, that affects some 6,000 women, 95 percent of whom
are Negro, the mothers of some 23,000 children.  The private agencies have been
completely overwhelmed by this disaster . . . .
Id.
110. Harris, McGehee Talk on Legislative Plans, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), Apr.
6, 1960, at 5-B.
111. Board Stiffens Welfare Aid Policy in Illegitimacy Cases, MORNING ADVOC. (Baton
Rouge), Apr. 9, 1960, at 7-B.
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Negro organizations . . . . They’ll listen to their own leaders more
than they will to us.112
This rise of moral rhetoric as an opaque means of referring to race
relied, in many cases, on rates of illegitimacy and common law mar-
riage, many of which had been artificially generated only a few years
previously.  Tom Ethridge, a columnist for the (Jackson) Clarion-
Ledger, stated in 1960 that “Mississippi is in second place [in the
Union] with 126 illegitimate births among every 1,000 babies.  Fig-
ures show the great majority of these are colored.”113  He continued:
Throughout the South there is strong sentiment for restricting wel-
fare aid where unwed mothers have more than one illegitimate off-
spring, but federal regulations have been a major obstacle to state
restrictions.  Washington puts up matching funds for much of the
state welfare benefits and Uncle Sam appears to be rather broad-
minded about promiscuity, especially where his “chosen people” are
concerned.114
A veiled allusion to African-Americans, Ethridge’s reference to
the federal government’s “chosen people,” shows not only that
“illegitimacy” had become a code for “black,” but that it had also be-
come an indictment.  Segregationists like Ethridge found ways not
only to discriminate against blacks via neutral language, but to recast
them as a cause, rather than a victim, of injustice.  Ethridge mentions,
for example, that the high cost of illegitimacy in the state resulted in
the denial of benefits to those who truly deserved them.  Citing Lou-
isiana Governor Jimmie Davis, he writes, “Davis has said the high
cost of illegitimacy ‘is unfair to the children, unfair to taxpayers and
to the old, sick people who have led upright lives.  If it were not for
this situation, we could take better care of our deserving needy and
still have money left.’”115  Subtly transforming blacks from targets
into perpetrators of injustice, Ethridge wrote, “White newspapers are
often plain-spoken in discussing this problem. The nation’s Negro
press, however, generally softpedals the subject, undoubtedly be-
cause Negroes figure so prominently in what has been called ‘tax-
112. Id.
113. Tom Ethridge, Mississippi Notebook, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), May 3,
1960, at 11.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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subsidized bastardy.’ (In protests against ‘second class citizenship’,
illegitimacy is never mentioned.)”116
By focusing on illegitimacy rates among African-Americans,
rates that had been artificially increased by covert legislative means,
segregationists achieved two important political goals.  Not only did
they develop a new mechanism for furthering racial discrimination
based on facially-neutral language, but by substituting the quality of
blackness for the characteristic of immorality, they transformed
blacks from the victims of wrong, to the agents of it.  Segregationists,
in other words, developed a language that enabled them to disguise
racial discrimination as moral reform.
CONCLUSION
The technique of employing neutral terms like moral character
and illegitimacy as code words for race was particularly effective in
promoting racial discrimination in the post-Brown South.  It provided
segregationists with a strategy for perpetuating racial discrimination
without the complications of appearing racist.  This was an art that,
thanks to the overt nature of Jim Crow, the South had enjoyed the
luxury of not having to perfect prior to Brown.  Following Brown,
however, the South learned quickly to employ more sophisticated
techniques of furthering white supremacy.  These techniques, to bor-
row from a critique leveled by Stanley Fish against right-wing rheto-
ric today, employed words as “stand-ins for prejudicial attitudes that
could no longer be openly displayed but could be displayed under
cover of a sanitized vocabulary that proclaimed the ideological inno-
cence of its users.”117
Not only did segregationists find a new vocabulary for referring
to race following Brown, but through an increased regulation of mar-
riage and illegitimacy they were able to clothe that vocabulary in a
garment of fact.  Social science, in other words, became an important
tool that segregationists manipulated to promote racist ends.  This
116. Id.
117. FISH, supra note 28, at 92.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, the evolution
of segregationist rhetoric following Brown helps contextualize prevailing trends in conservative
rhetoric today.  See, e.g., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT
GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 65
(Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (stating that “[t]o reverse skyrocketing out-of-
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births where welfare is sought.”).
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use of social science emerged as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s
reliance on sociology in deciding Brown that has so far gone unno-
ticed by scholars of the period.118
Finally, the combined strategies that segregationists employed
not only created a neutral language for race that was substantiated by
scientific evidence, but enabled segregationists to recast racial dis-
crimination as moral reform.  It enabled them to claim that African-
Americans, and not themselves, were the purveyors of wrongdoing
and that by discriminating against blacks in opaque rather than overt
ways, they were in fact upholding virtue. In a reference to modern ra-
cism that could have referred to the 1950s just as easily as the pres-
ent, Stanley Fish wrote “[i]t’s like alchemy or magic, now you see
white supremacy, but, presto chango, it is given a new description,
and now you see ‘equality for everyone’ with no change whatsoever
in the practice or the outcome.”119  Fish goes on to refer to the perver-
sions of Martin Luther King’s teachings by modern day racists.  Long
before King proclaimed “I have a dream my four little children will
one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of
their skin but by the content of their character,”120segregationists in
the South were building the framework for a system that would do
just that, and maintain white supremacy in the process.
118. For a discussion of the role that social science evidence played in the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Brown, see KLUGER, supra note 22, at 315-45.
119. FISH, supra note 28, at 91.
120. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217, 219 (James M. Washington ed.,
1986).
